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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—Determining the Suppressibility of a Defendant’s
Fingerprints Following an Unlawful Arrest; United States v. Olivares-Rangel,
458 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006).
Zane Gilmer*

INTRODUCTION
Following up on a tip from an informant, United States Border Patrol
Agents, Luis Armendariz and Mark Marshall, went to a New Mexico trailer park
on February 2, 2004.1 The agents saw a truck pulling out of a driveway, and
they blocked the truck from leaving.2 Agent Armendariz instantly recognized the
passenger of the vehicle as an illegal alien he had previously arrested for being in
the United States illegally.3 The agents questioned the two people in the truck
about their citizenship status without Miranda warnings.4 The defendant admitted
to being an illegal alien and the agents took him to the border-patrol station
where they ﬁngerprinted him and asked about his biographical information.5
The defendant’s ﬁngerprints led the agents to the defendant’s immigration record
(A-ﬁle), indicating the defendant’s deportation history.6 Finally, Agent Armendariz
read the defendant his Miranda warnings.7
A grand jury indicted the defendant on March 4, 2004, for his presence
in the United States after deportation.8 Due to the defendant’s previous felony
conviction, prosecutors charged him with a separate violation, making him
eligible for a maximum prison sentence of twenty years.9 The defendant ﬁled a
motion to suppress any physical evidence and statements obtained as a result of
his unlawful seizure and interrogation.10 The defendant claimed the interrogation

* University of Wyoming College of Law J.D. Candidate, 2009.
1

U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006).

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1106.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 106-07. The grand jury indicted the defendant according to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000).

Id.
9
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1107. The federal statute prohibiting immigrants from being
in the United States following deportation is 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Reentry of Removed Aliens, 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000).
10

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1107.
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and detention violated his Fourth Amendment right of unreasonable seizure
and Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.11 The United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the motion to suppress,
concluding that the defendant’s stop and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.12 Furthermore, the court found the defendant’s ﬁngerprints and statements
were the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and required suppression.13 The court also
rejected the government’s argument that the defendant’s identity or body is never
suppressible as fruit of an unlawful arrest based on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.14
The court rejected this argument stating the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza
only addressed jurisdictional challenges under the Fourth Amendment and
not evidentiary challenges as existed in this case.15 As a result, that case did not
prohibit this court from suppressing illegally obtained evidence.16 The government
appealed the suppression of evidence.17 The issue on appeal for the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals became whether a defendant’s identity, speciﬁcally ﬁngerprints,
are suppressible following an unlawful arrest.18 The court held a defendant’s
ﬁngerprints obtained in certain unconstitutional manners are suppressible.19
The Rangel court correctly interpreted leading case law in the area of the
suppressibility of a defendant’s identity in order to make its decision. This case
note will analyze the leading cases regarding the suppressibility of a defendant’s
identity.20 More speciﬁcally, this case note will explore the circuit court split
regarding the suppressibility of a defendant’s identity.21 Finally, this case note will
focus on the Tenth Circuit Court’s analysis of case law and doctrines relating to
the suppressibility of a defendant’s identity, speciﬁcally a defendant’s ﬁngerprints,
in United States v. Olivares-Rangel.22

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 1108; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

15

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1108.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 1112-16.

20

See infra notes 74-133 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 69-133 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: The Precedent is Set for Misunderstanding
There is a long line of cases dealing with the admissibility and suppressibility
of a defendant’s identity.23 These cases form the necessary framework to fully
understand the law’s current state and to understand how the court in United
States v. Olivares-Rangel came to its conclusion.24 These cases will be further
discussed in the sections that follow; however, it is important to initially discuss
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza since this case note continuously refers to this case.25
The U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza reasoned a defendant’s
body or identity is never suppressible in a criminal or civil proceeding, even
following an unlawful search or seizure.26 Furthermore, the Court noted , at his
deportation hearing, Lopez-Mendoza objected only to being summoned to the
hearing, not to the evidence introduced against him.27

23
See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding a detention for the sole purpose
of obtaining a suspect’s ﬁngerprints is unlawful); U.S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (holding a
witness’s in-court identiﬁcation of the defendant is not suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest
when the witness was discovered prior to any unlawful police misconduct); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding the body or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as a fruit of
an unlawful arrest in the context of a defendant’s challenge to their presence in court. Furthermore,
the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation hearings); U.S. v. GuzmanBruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding no remedy exists for a defendant when an
illegal arrest leads to the defendant’s identity, which in turn leads to other incriminating evidence.
The court relied on Lopez-Mendoza’s holding that the body or identity of a defendant is never a
suppressible fruit of an unlawful arrest).
24

See Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1109-10; see infra notes 74-133 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 76-133 and accompanying text.

26

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“the body or identity of a defendant or respondent in
a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it
is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”). Although the Court in
Lopez-Mendoza stated the defendant’s body or identity is never suppressible in a criminal or civil
proceeding, as explained in the analysis section of this note, the proposition is not as absolute as
it appears. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text. Lopez-Mendoza addressed two separate
issues regarding two defendants. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034. First, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) agents arrested Adan Lopez-Mendoza for being in the country illegally.
Id. at 1040. The evidence that Lopez-Mendoza did not object to included an afﬁdavit he signed
after being arrested, admitting being in the country illegally. Id. At his deportation hearing, LopezMendoza objected to being summoned to the deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest, but
did not object to any evidence entered against him. Id. The immigration judge found that, contrary
to Lopez-Mendoza’s argument, any supposed illegal arrest of Lopez-Mendoza was irrelevant to the
deportation hearing and therefore found Lopez-Mendoza deportable. Id. at 1035-36.
27

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040.
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The Court also addressed the arrest of Elias Sandoval-Sanchez in LopezMendoza.28 Sandoval-Sanchez argued that ofﬁcers arrested him unlawfully and
evidence offered against him to prove his unlawful presence in the country was
suppressible as fruit of that unlawful arrest.29
In evaluating the case on appeal, the Supreme Court compared SandovalSanchez’s situation to Lopez-Mendoza’s and recognized them as distinguishable.30
The Court found Sandoval-Sanchez’s claim for suppression of evidence more
persuasive because, unlike Lopez-Mendoza, Sandoval-Sanchez objected to the
evidence being presented against him at the deportation hearing rather than
simply objecting to his presence at the hearing.31 The Court then identiﬁed the
general rule in criminal proceedings: evidence obtained due to an unlawful arrest
is suppressible.32 The Court then recognized, however, that the exclusionary rule’s
use beyond criminal proceedings is less clear.33
In an attempt to deﬁne the exclusionary rule’s applicability beyond criminal
proceedings, the Court evaluated and balanced the costs and beneﬁts of applying
the doctrine to civil proceedings such as civil deportation hearings.34 Determining
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation hearings, the Supreme
Court held the arrest did not violate Sandoval-Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment
rights and his statements were admissible.35

28

Id. at 1040-41. Ofﬁcers arrested Sandoval-Sanchez independently of Lopez-Mendoza. Id.
at 1034. INS agents arrested Sandoval-Sanchez at his work for being in the country illegally. Id. at
1036. INS agents questioned Sandoval-Sanchez following his arrest and recorded him admitting to
being in the country illegally. Id. at 1037.
29
Id. at 1037. An immigration judge rejected this claim, ﬁnding the legality of his arrest
irrelevant to the proceedings. Id. at 1037-38. The judge found Sandoval-Sanchez deportable based
in part on his admission. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found the arrest violated SandovalSanchez’s Fourth Amendment rights and held his statements inadmissible and ultimately reversed
his deportation order. Id. at 1038.
30

Id. at 1040.

31

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040.

32

Id. at 1040-41. The Court made this statement in reference to the applicability of
the exclusionary rule being unclear in non-criminal cases such as various civil proceedings like
deportation hearings. Id.
33

Id. at 1041.

34

Id. at 1042-50. The Court relied on United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), which set
forth elements for deciding in which type of judicial proceedings the exclusionary rule should apply.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042-50. Based on application of these elements, the Court decided
the circumstances and complications of civil deportation proceedings prevented the exclusionary
rule’s application in such cases. Id. at 1050.
35

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051.
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Circuit Courts Split Over the Admissibility of Identifying Evidence
In interpreting Lopez-Mendoza, some courts, including the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Guzman-Bruno, have held the exclusionary remedy is not
available when a defendant’s illegal arrest leads to the defendant’s identity, which
lead in turn to the discovery of an ofﬁcial ﬁle or other evidence.36 Other courts,
including the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Guevara-Martinez, have held
that the availability of the exclusionary remedy will depend on the purpose for
which the identiﬁcation procedure is performed.37 If, for example, ﬁngerprinting
36
U.S. v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1994). INS ofﬁcers detained GuzmanBruno for suspicion of being in the country illegally and Guzman-Bruno admitted to this suspicion
and to a prior drug conviction. Id. Following this admission, the government indicted GuzmanBruno under federal statutes for being in the country illegally after deportation and having a prior
felony conviction. Id. Guzman-Bruno moved to have all of the evidence resulting from his arrest
suppressed, arguing the unlawfulness of the initial detention. Id. The District Court for the Central
District of California suppressed all evidence resulting from Guzman-Bruno’s arrest but refused to
suppress his admission of his name to ofﬁcers. Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged and relied on
Lopez-Mendoza, and found the defendant’s body or identity is never suppressible as a fruit of an
illegal arrest. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d. at 422.

In 2001, the Ninth Circuit decided U.S. v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2001). The
court refused to exclude from evidence the defendant’s ﬁngerprints taken following an illegal arrest.
Id. It determined the State took the ﬁngerprints from the defendant to prove the defendant’s identity
and not for investigatory purposes. Id. at 1215. Therefore, the ﬁngerprints were not suppressible.
Id.
37
U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001). During a trafﬁc stop, ofﬁcers
placed Martin Guevara-Martinez under arrest after ofﬁcers found methamphetamine in his car. Id.
at 753. Following the arrest, Guevara-Martinez gave ofﬁcers a false name, but admitted to being in
the country illegally. Id. Also following the arrest, ofﬁcers ﬁngerprinted Guevara-Martinez which
revealed his true identity and discovery of an INS ﬁle showing a previous deportation. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that without evidence showing ofﬁcials took the defendant’s ﬁngerprints during
a routine booking process, and not for obtaining evidence for an INS proceeding against GuevaraMartinez, the district court properly suppressed the evidence. Id. at 753. Other cases support the
proposition if ﬁngerprints are taken during the routine booking process, then those ﬁngerprints
are admissible against the defendant for an unrelated charge or prosecution for another crime. See
People v. McInnis, 6 Cal.3d 821 (Cal. 1972); Paulson v. State, 257 So.2d 303(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972). In Guevara-Martinez, the court was referencing the fact the government failed to show
that the initial ﬁngerprints were taken as part of the routine booking process for the possession of
methamphetamine charge. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755-56. If that was the case, then the
court is insinuating those ﬁngerprints might be admissible against Guevara-Martinez in prosecuting
him for being in the country illegally since that was a separate charge. Id. Nevertheless, because the
government failed to show the ﬁngerprints were taken during the routine booking process, the court
does not further address this issue or speculate on any potential outcome. Id. at 756.

The Eighth Circuit made this decision after determining that Davis and Hays controlled, rather
than Lopez-Mendoza. Id. at 753. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Lopez-Mendoza did not control
in this case because it does not stand for the proposition that a suspect’s identity or body can never
be a fruit of an unlawful detention or arrest, but that Lopez-Mendoza actually strictly addressed only
jurisdictional issues. Id. Supporting its position, the court explained that the Lopez-Mendoza Court,
when dealing with the issue relating to Sandoval-Sanchez, did not distinguish between identity
related evidence and other types of suppressible evidence following an unlawful arrest. GuevaraMartinez, 262 F.3d at 753. The court reasoned that if the Lopez-Mendoza Court meant identity

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 9

592

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

occurs as part of the routine booking process, then the exclusionary rule will not
be available.38 But if ﬁngerprinting is consciously undertaken for the purpose of
obtaining evidence for us, say, in INS proceeding, then the defendant will be
entitled to suppression of any evidence derived from the ﬁngerprinting.39
Several years following the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Guevara Martinez, the
Tenth Circuit faced a similar issue regarding the suppressibility of a defendant’s
ﬁngerprints, in United States v. Olivares-Rangel.40

PRINCIPAL CASE
Following a tip, Border Patrol Agents arrested Gustavo Olivares-Rangel for
being in the country illegally.41 Fingerprints taken from Rangel led the agents to
Rangel’s immigration ﬁle (A-ﬁle), proving that Rangel was in the country following
a previous deportation.42 The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico granted Olivares-Rangel’s motion to suppress various pieces of evidence
including his ﬁngerprints and A-ﬁle based on his unlawful arrest.43
The issue on appeal for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit turned on whether evidence of a defendant’s identity, including ﬁngerprints,

related evidence is never suppressible in a criminal proceeding, then it would have said that when
dealing with the evidentiary challenge from Sandoval-Sanchez. Id. at 754. Instead, the Court made
the statement that the body or identity is never suppressible when discussing the jurisdictional
issue with the Lopez-Mendoza matter. Id. Additionally, the Lopez-Mendoza Court never mentioned
possible exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1040-41. The Court only said the exclusionary
rule still applies to the criminal process, but its application is less clear beyond that. Id. Since
the Lopez-Mendoza Court made that statement in reference to the jurisdictional issue regarding
Lopez-Mendoza, and not in reference to Sandoval-Sanchez’s evidentiary issue, the Court did not
intend the holding to mean identity related evidence can never be suppressed. Guevara-Martinez,
262 F.3d at 754. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Lopez-Mendoza never
mentioned Davis or Hayes, Lopez-Mendoza did not overrule those cases. Id. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit had an obligation to follow those earlier cases. Id. The court rejected the government’s
contention that Davis and Hayes do not apply because Guevara-Martinez was not arrested for the
sole purpose of collecting his ﬁngerprints. Id. at 755. The court, however, reasoned the exclusionary
rule is applicable whenever the government obtains evidence due to exploiting the primary illegality,
regardless of whether the detention was for the sole purpose of collecting the ﬁngerprints. Id. The
court found the government neglected to offer evidence showing the government obtained the
ﬁngerprints during the routine booking process instead for purposes to pursue INS proceedings
against Guevara-Martinez. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755. Given the circumstances of how the
government obtained the evidence, the court ordered the suppression of the evidence. Id.
38

See U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001).

39

See id.

40

U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006).

41

Id. at 1106.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 1107-08.
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statements, and A-ﬁle, are suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.44 The
Court of Appeals also addressed the government’s argument that Lopez-Mendoza
held that a suspect’s identity or body is never suppressible.45 The appeals court
rejected the government’s blanket claim, and interpreted Lopez-Mendoza to mean
that a suspect’s identity is not suppressible when a suspect argues the court lacks
jurisdiction due to an unlawful arrest.46 The court stated, however, that LopezMendoza did not pertain to evidentiary issues relating to a defendant’s identity
following an illegal arrest or detention.47 For evidentiary issues, the court should
use the traditional Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to determine if evidence
relating to a defendant’s identity is suppressible.48
In evaluating the admissibility of the defendant’s ﬁngerprints, the court
recognized the government’s argument on appeal did not go beyond the
Lopez-Mendoza argument that the identity or body of the defendant is never
suppressible.49 The court, however, already rejected such a blanket claim.50 In the
alternative, the government claimed that even if Lopez-Mendoza did not preclude
the suppression of the defendant’s ﬁngerprints, then traditional principles of
the exclusionary rule preclude their suppression.51 The government based this
contention on the theory that this case is distinguishable from Davis and Hayes.52

44

Id. at 1108. Rangel’s dissent reasoned the majority needlessly engaged in the debate regarding
whether evidence relating to a defendant’s identity is suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1121-22 (Baldock, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that engaging
in this debate was unnecessary because the agents lawfully arrested the defendant. Id. at 1122
(Baldock, J., dissenting). Speciﬁcally, the dissent argued that reasonable suspicion existed for the
agents to initially stop Rangel’s truck and subsequently, sufﬁcient probable cause existed for the
INS agents to lawfully arrest Rangel. Id. at 1122-23 (Baldock, J., dissenting). Therefore, the agents
lawfully arrested Rangel so any evidence derived from the arrest, including Rangel’s ﬁngerprints and
A-ﬁle, were admissible. Id. (Baldock, J., dissenting). In response to these arguments, the majority
justiﬁed its decision to not address these issues claiming that the state failed to raise the issue of
lawful arrest on appeal and therefore conceded that the agents unlawfully arrested Rangel. Id. at
1107. Therefore, the majority stated the only issue as whether a defendant’s identity is suppressible
following an unlawful arrest. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1108.
45

Id. at 1109-10.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 1112.

48

Id.

49

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1112. The government argued the ﬁngerprints were admissible since the government
did not seize them for the purpose of linking Olivares-Rangel to a crime. Brief for Petitioners at 10,
U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (2006) (No. 04-2194), 2004 WL 5536709.
52
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112. Davis v. Mississippi held that the Fourth Amendment
applies to investigatory stages and, therefore, a detention for the sole purpose of obtaining a suspect’s
ﬁngerprints is unlawful. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 725-29 (1969). Hayes v. Florida,
reafﬁrmed a similar proposition. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985).
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The government claimed this case is distinguishable because in both Davis and
Hayes, the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were taken in an attempt to link the defendant
to a crime, but here the agents did not take the ﬁngerprints with the purpose
of linking Olivares-Rangel to a crime.53 The court neither directly accepted nor
rejected this argument, but rather analyzed the holdings in Davis and Hayes in
conjunction with Lopez-Mendoza.54
In its analysis, the appeals court distinguished between ﬁngerprints obtained
as a result of an unconstitutional investigation, which are suppressible, and
ﬁngerprints obtained as part of a routine booking procedure, which are not
suppressible.55 Fingerprints obtained through routine booking procedures, even
if obtained following an unlawful arrest, are not suppressible.56 This is based
on the importance of identifying suspects the government has in custody.57
Conversely, if an illegal arrest or detention occurs for the purpose of obtaining a
person’s ﬁngerprints for investigatory reasons, the ﬁngerprints are then fruits of
the poisonous tree and suppressible.58 In determining the government’s purpose
behind a suspect’s arrest and ﬁngerprinting, the court stated it must evaluate the
government’s intent.59 The court determined the record was unclear as to the
government’s intent when it ﬁngerprinted the defendant.60 Therefore, the court
remanded the case to determine the government’s purpose in ﬁngerprinting the
defendant.61

Admissibility of INS File
The court of appeals then addressed the admissibility of the defendant’s
A-ﬁle.62 Speciﬁcally, the court discussed the government’s contention that the
A-ﬁle is not suppressible since the government did not discover it solely because
of the defendant’s illegal detention.63 The government contended the A-ﬁle was

53

Brief for Petitioners at 10, U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (2006) (No. 04-2194),
2004 WL 5536709.
54

See Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112-16. Ultimately the court remanded the case in order
to determine the purpose for which the government seized Olivares-Rangel’s ﬁngerprints. Id. at
1113.
55

Id.

56

Id. at 1112-13.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 1114.

59

Olivares Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1116.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 1117.
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not suppressible because the contents of the ﬁle were compiled independently
from the defendant’s illegal seizure.64 The appeals court determined the A-ﬁle’s
admissibility rests only on whether the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were suppressible.65
The court determined if the ﬁngerprints were suppressible, so too is the A-ﬁle.66
The ﬁngerprints ultimately led to the A-ﬁle’s discovery, regardless of whether the
government compiled the ﬁle prior to, or independently of, the illegal seizure.67
Thus, the court also remanded this issue for reconsideration in conjunction with
the issue of the ﬁngerprints’ admissibility.68 Analysis of this case requires a look
at the other circuit court decisions addressing the suppressibility of a defendant’s
identity and ﬁngerprints.

ANALYSIS
The circuit court split has caused confusion concerning the issue of the
admissibility or suppressibility of a defendant’s ﬁngerprints following an unlawful
arrest.69 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Olivares-Rangel illustrates
the correct approach to analyzing this issue because the holding appropriately
characterizes Lopez-Mendoza as only applying to civil cases and jurisdictional
issues.70 Several things will be discussed and analyzed in this analysis to support
this argument. First, the authority the Court in Lopez-Mendoza cited for its
proposition that the body or identity of the defendant is never suppressible fruit
dealt with jurisdictional challenges, not evidentiary challenges.71 Second, the
attenuation doctrine supports the Olivares-Rangel holding.72 Finally, as OlivaresRangel points out, case law supports distinguishing between the purpose in which
the government obtains a defendant’s ﬁngerprints for the purposes of applying the
exclusionary rule.73
64

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d. at 1117.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 1119.

69

See Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1110.

70

Id. at 1112; see generally David R. Miller and James M. Beach, Employer Options Under The
OSHA Inspection Warrant Procedure: A Rock and a Hard Place, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 804, n.54
(1990) (explaining the holding in Lopez-Mendoza as standing for the proposition that the exclusionary
rule does not extend to civil deportation hearings); Michelle D. Grady, Fourth Amendment-Evidence
Unconstitutionally Seized From a Parolee’s Residence is Admissible at the Parolee’s Revocation Hearing
Because Parole Boards are not Required by Federal Law to Exclude Evidence Obtained in Violation of the
Fourth Amendment-Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998),
10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 215, 228-31 (1999) (explaining the Lopez-Mendoza Court refused to
apply the exclusionary rule in this case, in part, because of the high social costs of applying the rule
to civil deportation hearings).
71

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984); see infra notes 74-97 and accompanying

72

See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.

73

See infra notes 111-133 and accompanying text.

text.
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I. Lopez-Mendoza as a Jurisdictional, Not an Evidentiary Holding
As the Rangel court correctly explained, Lopez-Mendoza does not stand for
the broad proposition that a defendant’s identity is never suppressible as fruit of
an unlawful arrest in the context of evidentiary challenges.74 In fact, the statement
in Lopez-Mendoza that the body or identity of a defendant is never a suppressible
fruit of an unlawful arrest does not even apply to evidentiary issues, but rather
jurisdictional-based issues.75 The Court made this statement in reference to
Lopez-Mendoza’s objection that the deportation court lacked jurisdiction over
him because of the unlawful arrest.76 Lopez-Mendoza cites as authority both Frisbie
v. Collins and Gerstein v. Pugh as holding the defendant’s body or identity is never
suppressible as fruit, in discussing Lopez-Mendoza’s jurisdictional objection.77 Both
of these cases deal with jurisdictional challenges, not evidentiary challenges.78

A. The True Meaning of Frisbie v. Collins and Gerstein v. Pugh
Citing Frisbie and Gerstein, Lopez-Mendoza stated, “The body or identity
of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself
suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful
arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”79 In Frisbie, a defendant challenged his
conviction claiming Michigan ofﬁcers forcibly seized him while living in Chicago
and brought him to Michigan to stand trial for murder.80 The Court asserted
the government satisﬁed Frisbie’s due process rights because he received notice
of the charges against him, stood trial for those charges, and was then convicted
following a fair trial.81 Furthermore, the Court stated the Constitution can not

74
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112 (explaining the language in Lopez-Mendoza stating that
a defendant’s identity or body is never a suppressible fruit refers only to jurisdictional challenges);
U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding Lopez-Mendoza has no
bearing on the suppression of illegally obtained identity related evidence in a criminal proceeding).
75
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112; Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 754; see infra notes
74-97 and accompanying text (explaining how Lopez-Mendoza only applies to jurisdictional and
not evidentiary challenges because the Court made the statement in reference to Lopez-Mendoza’s
jurisdictional challenge and not Sandoval-Sanchez’s evidentiary challenge).
76

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040.

77

Id. at 1039; Frisbie v. Collins, 343 U.S. 519 (1952); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103

(1975).
78
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039; Frisbie, 343 U.S. at 519; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103;
Abraham Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties: An Endangered Species,? 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 449, n.86 and accompanying text (1991) (explaining Frisbie is part of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine which stands for the proposition that an unlawful arrest can not impair the ability of
a court’s jurisdiction over the defendant and further that this proposition has been subsequently
upheld in Gerstein).
79

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039-40.

80

Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.

81

Id. at 522.
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possibly require a guilty person, who was correctly convicted, to escape justice
simply because he stood trial against his will.82 Frisbie does not stand for the
proposition that a person’s identity is never suppressible as fruit of an unlawful
arrest.83 Rather, the issue there was jurisdictional.84 This decision stands for the
idea that a defendant’s conviction is not reversible simply because of an unlawful
arrest.85
Similarly, the second case the Lopez-Mendoza Court cited for its proposition,
Gerstein, did not concern evidentiary issues when discussing the admissibility of a
defendant’s identity.86 Rather, Gerstein’s issue concerned whether ofﬁcials can arrest
a defendant and force him to face charges for a crime with only a prosecutor’s
information, and with no subsequent probable cause hearing in front of a judicial
ofﬁcer.87 The Lopez-Mendoza Court cited Frisbie, stating that an illegal arrest or
detention will not void a subsequent conviction.88 It did so, however, in the context
of explaining that a suspect who is in custody may request a probable cause hearing
to determine the lawfulness of his detention, but failure to provide a probable

82

Id.

83

U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining Frisbie deals
with the jurisdiction over a person and not with a defendant’s challenges to his illegally obtained
identity); U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating the Court in Frisbie
held the power of the court to hear a case is not destroyed simply because the government brought
the defendant within the court’s jurisdiction against his will); See Ashley Wright Baker, Forcible
Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies For Alvares-Machain, 48 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1373, 1394-95 (2004) (explaining the exclusionary rule did not apply in Frisbie because there
was no evidence to be suppressed since the objection was to the jurisdiction of the court over the
defendant).
84

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1111 (explaining Frisbie dealt with the jurisdiction over a person
and not with a defendant’s challenges to his illegally obtained identity); Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d
at 754; see Baker, supra note 83, at 1394-95 (explaining Frisbie combined with Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436 (1886) make up the Ker-Frisbie doctrine which is often cited to uphold jurisdiction over
a defendant; moreover, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine stands for the proposition that a court maintains
criminal jurisdiction over a defendant, regardless of the illegal method used to provide the court in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant).
85
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1111 (explaining a defendant can be brought before a court and
stand trial even though the government unlawfully arrested him); Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at
754 (stating Gerstein v. Pugh later afﬁrmed the Frisbie holding when Gerstein held an illegal arrest
does not void a subsequent prosecution and conviction).
86
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (stating the issue on appeal as whether a
defendant arrested and held on a prosecutor’s information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause); see Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD.
L. REV. 1, n.320 (2000) (citing Gerstein for the proposition that an illegal arrest does not void a
subsequent prosecution and conviction).
87
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111; see Brady, supra note 86, at n.320 and accompanying text (citing
Gerstein for the proposition that an illegal arrest does not void a subsequent prosecution and
conviction).
88

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119.
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cause hearing will not result in a defendant’s conviction being overturned.89 Like
Frisbie, Gerstein did not address any admissibility of evidence issues regarding a
defendant’s identity.90 Rather, Gerstein simply addressed jurisdictional issues.91

B. The Misunderstood Identity of Lopez-Mendoza
The second reason supporting the proposition that Lopez-Mendoza stands for
jurisdictional and not evidentiary challenges is the fact that Lopez-Mendoza itself
was addressing a challenge to jurisdiction and not evidence.92 When the LopezMendoza Court stated a defendant’s identity is never suppressible, it did so not
in addressing the evidentiary challenges made by Sandoval-Sanchez, but rather
was made in reference to Lopez-Mendoza’s jurisdictional challenge.93 SandovalSanchez objected to the use of the evidence the INS agents seized, arguing the
agents unlawfully arrested him so any evidence obtained as a result cannot be used
against him.94 Conversely, Lopez-Mendoza challenged the court summoning him
to a deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest.95 It was in reference to this
jurisdictional challenge the Court stated a defendant is never himself suppressible
as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.96 Therefore, the Court did not anticipate the
statement of a defendant’s body or identity never being a suppressible fruit to
apply beyond the jurisdictional context in which it used it.97

89

Id.

90

Id.; see Brady, supra note 86, at nn. 67 & 320.

91

U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez,
262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001); see Brady, supra note 86, at nn. 67 & 320.
92

See Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1111 (“Lopez argued only that the immigration court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him due to the illegal arrest” and “did not challenge the admissibility of
his statements to ofﬁcers disclosing his identity”).
93

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984) (stating the body or identity of
a defendant is never suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest and on that basis alone the issue
relating to Lopez-Mendoza is decided). The Court went on to decide the evidentiary issue regarding
Sandoval-Sanchez and without discussing the admissibility of a defendant’s identity, determined that
Sandoval-Sanchez cannot object to the evidence offered against him because the Court determined
the exclusionary rule should not apply to civil deportation hearings. Id. at 1040-47; Henry G.
Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An Update on Locating the Undocumented and a
Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 548-50 (1991) (explaining Lopez-Mendoza objected to the deportation
proceeding against him, not to the actual evidence being entered against him; whereas, SandovalSanchez objected to the actual evidence offered by the INS agents).
94

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037-38.

95

Id. at 1040.

96

Id. at 1039-40.

97

Id.
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II. How Attenuation Plays a Role
The general rule of admissibility of evidence seized as a result of an unlawful
arrest is the court should suppress it.98 However, it is not enough for the discovery
of the evidence to simply follow an unlawful arrest; the important issue is whether
the unlawful arrest was a but-for cause of the discovery of the evidence.99 In other
words, it is not sufﬁcient the government’s discovery of the evidence follow the
unlawful conduct, but rather, the question is but-for the unlawful conduct of the
government, would the government have discovered the evidence?100 For instance,
there are times when a court will still hold evidence admissible even though the
police discovered the evidence as a result of an unlawful arrest.101 An example of
this is when the court determines attenuation exists.102
Attenuation exists “when the casual connection between the illegal
government conduct and the discovery of evidence is so ‘remote as to dissipate’
the taint from the illegal conduct.”103 Three factors the Supreme Court uses in
98

See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987); see David R. Childress, Maryland
v. Garrison: Extending the Good Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 151,
151 (1988) (explaining evidence should generally be excluded from defendant’s trial when the
government unconstitutionally seizes it).
99
See J. Spencer Clark, Hudson v. Michigan: “Knock and Announce”—An Outdated Rule?,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 433, 438-39 (2007) (explaining but-for causation as a necessary, but not a
sufﬁcient condition for suppressibility of evidence that is seized following unlawful conduct by the
government).
100

See id. (stating but-for causation is a necessary condition for suppression of evidence).

101

See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (holding evidence seized resulting
from unlawful conduct is inadmissible except when it is sufﬁciently attenuated from the taint of the
unlawful conduct); U.S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (holding photographs the police took
of the defendant following the unlawful arrest were suppressible, but the in court testimony of the
victim was not since the victim’s recollection of the defendant was attenuated from the unlawful
arrest and was thus untainted by the unlawful arrest); see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
592 (2006) (refusing to suppress evidence seized following a search of a home simply because the
ofﬁcers failed to knock prior to entry, stating that even though the entry was a but-for cause of
the discovery of the evidence, the police would have executed the warrant properly and found the
same evidence); Joe Rivera, When is Good Faith Good Enough? The History, Use, And Future of Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(B), 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 919, 948 (2007); The Georgetown
University Law Center, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 38,
89-90 (2007) (explaining evidence discovered following an unlawful search may be admissible if
subsequent consent given by the defendant was sufﬁcient to attenuate the discovery of the evidence
from the unlawful search).
102

See David Carn, Hey Ofﬁcer, Didn’t Someone Teach you to Knock? The Supreme Court Says
No Exclusion of Evidence For Knock-and-Announce Violations in Hudson v. Michigan, 58 MERCER
L. REV. 779, 785 (2007) (stating evidence the government illegally obtained may be admissible if
attenuation occurs, that is, when the causal connection between the illegal government act and the
discovery of the evidence “is so remote to dissipate the taint from the illegal conduct”). Two other
exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist, which are inevitable discovery and independent source.
Id. at n.56.
103

Id. at 785.
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evaluating whether the causal chain has been sufﬁciently attenuated are the time
between the government’s illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence,
whether intervening circumstances exist, and the purpose and ﬂagrancy of the
government’s illegal conduct.104 Since the exclusionary rule’s sole purpose is to
deter future police misconduct, the focus behind the principle of attenuation is to
determine the point at which the diminishing returns of the deterrent principle
no longer outweigh the social costs of exclusion.105
United States v. Crews demonstrates an application of this rule and why
the Court in Crew allowed a robbery victim to provide in court testimony
identifying the defendant as the person who robbed her, even though the police
unlawfully arrested him.106 The Supreme Court held a defendant is never himself
suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree.107 The defendant moved to have all
identifying evidence of him suppressed including line-up photographs and incourt identiﬁcations made by witnesses.108 The Court reasoned suppressing the
victim’s in-court testimony would not serve the purpose of deterring future police
misconduct.109 Evidence suppression would not deter future misconduct in this
case because a victim’s memory of a suspect is too attenuated from the misconduct
of the police.110
104
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); Jack A. Levy, The Exclusionary Rule, 85
GEO. L.J. 969, 976-77 (1997).
105
See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(a), at 235 (3d ed. 1996); E. Martin
Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock and Announce Rule” and the Sacred
Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, n.62 and accompanying text (2005) (explaining that
application of the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the attenuation principle may result in the admissibility
of unlawfully seized evidence if excluding the evidence would provide little or no beneﬁt in the
form of deterrence, but would result in large societal costs of allowing a crime to go unpunished);
See Estrada, supra note 105, at 90; Jennifer Yackley, Hudson v. Michigan: Has the Court Turned the
Exclusionary Rule into the Exclusionary Exception?, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 429 (2007) (stating
when “there is no appreciable deterrent effect, the Court does not consider the exclusionary rule an
appropriate remedy”).
106
Crews, 445 U.S. at 463-66 (holding photographs the police took of the defendant following
the unlawful arrest were suppressible, but the in court testimony of the victim was not since the
victim’s recollection of the defendant was attenuated from the unlawful arrest and was thus untainted
by the unlawful arrest).
107

Id. at 474. The defendant wanted to suppress not only any photographs used to identify
him as the perpetrator, but he also wanted to suppress the use of any in court identiﬁcations of him
by witnesses. Id. at 467-68. The Court held that the government can not be completely deprived of
the opportunity to prove a suspect’s guilt through untainted evidence from the illegal activity. Id. at
474. Thus, in-court identiﬁcations are not suppressible as “fruits of the poisonous tree” because they
were not directly tainted by any unlawful police conduct. Id.
108

Crews, 445 U.S. at 474.

109

See id. at 463-64; Estrada, supra note 105, at n.62 and accompanying text.

110

Crews, 445 U.S. at 463-64; see also U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277-80 (1978) (admitting
a witness’s testimony even though ofﬁcials discovered the witness’ identity due to the unlawful
arrest). The court held the witness’ testimony was admissible because it was sufﬁciently attenuated
from the taint of the unlawful arrest in part because of the likelihood the witness, through free will,
would have came forward on her own and therefore been discovered through lawful means. Id.
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III. Distinguishing How the Government Obtains Fingerprints
Further distinguishing but-for causation from the discovery of the evidence
simply following the unlawful arrest, is the way in which the government
obtained the evidence. For example, the Rangel court correctly distinguished
between ﬁngerprints taken as part of the routine booking process and ﬁngerprints
taken solely for investigatory purposes.111 The Supreme Court ﬁrst recognized
this distinction in Davis v. Mississippi.112 In Davis, the Court held the Fourth
Amendment applies to the investigatory stages of the criminal process.113
Therefore, a detention for the sole purpose of obtaining a suspect’s ﬁngerprints
is unlawful.114 Although the Court determined the police acted unlawfully, it
conceded the possibility that some ﬁngerprints obtained without probable cause
may comply with the Fourth Amendment.115 The Court, however, neglected to
elaborate on what kind of situation this may be as that narrow question was
not before them.116 In applying the exclusionary rule, the Court suppressed the
unlawfully seized ﬁngerprints and overturned Davis’ conviction.117
Various courts have also recognized the inherent differences between
the booking process and other interactions with suspects that imply a more
investigatory aspect.118 Courts make this distinction because the function of the

111

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112-13; see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969);
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)
(deﬁning interrogation as including either “express questioning or its functional equivalent,”
including, “words or actions on the part of the police . . . which the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”).
112

Davis, 394 U.S. 721. In Davis, the police rounded up and detained dozens of black youths,
without probable cause, and took them to the police station for the sole purpose of obtaining their
ﬁngerprints to link them to a rape. Id. at 722.
113

Id.

114

Id. The U.S. Supreme Court afﬁrmed a similar proposition in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811
(1985). In Hayes, a rape investigation focused on the petitioner as the primary suspect. Hayes, 470
U.S. at 811. The police went to the petitioner’s home to obtain his ﬁngerprints and the petitioner
hesitated to comply with the ofﬁcer’s request. Id. The ofﬁcers told him they would arrest him if
he refused to accompany them to the police station for ﬁngerprinting. Id. The petitioner ﬁnally
submitted to the request because he said he would rather go to the police station under his own
volition, rather than be arrested. Id. The Court held that forcing a defendant to the police station
for investigatory ﬁngerprinting, without probable cause, violates the Constitution. Id. at 816. The
Court did leave open the possibility of brieﬂy detaining a suspect in “the ﬁeld,” as part of a Terry
stop, in order to ﬁngerprint the suspect for identiﬁcation purposes when reasonable suspicion exists,
but not probable cause. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.
115

Davis, 394 U.S. at 727.

116

Id.

117

See id. at 727-28.

118

See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (holding answers given during
the routine booking process for administrative purposes are admissible); U.S. v. Salgado, 292 F.3d
1169,1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the defendant freely provided information about his place of

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 9

602

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

booking process is not investigatory by nature.119 In fact, the government cannot
ask questions designed to incriminate the defendant, during this process.120
Evidence obtained during the booking process is admissible as evidence against
the defendant even if the evidence incriminates the defendant.121 However, the
government cannot turn the booking process into an investigatory tool.122 The
booking process has a long history of being afforded less protection than other
criminal processes.123 Because of this, evidence collected through the routine
booking process lacks the same evidentiary protection that evidence would receive
if discovered in an investigatory manner.124
Rangel correctly recognized not all identifying evidence is admissible following
an unlawful arrest.125 The court determined the traditional exclusionary rule
announced in Wong Sun still applies to evidence, including identifying evidence,
if the evidence results from exploiting the original unlawful conduct.126 As the
Rangel court recognized, any evidence, if obtained in a manner for investigatory
purposes by exploiting the illegal arrest, is suppressible even if the government

birth and citizenship as part of the routine booking process and ofﬁcials sought the information
as nothing more than for routine booking information, not incriminating information); U.S. v.
Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding INS agent’s questioning of defendant about
his true name during the booking process in order to link him to his incriminating immigration
ﬁle constituted unlawful interrogation so the evidence provided by the defendant about his identity
should have been suppressed).
119

Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 601-02 (explaining that although some evidence obtained by the government during a
routine booking process may incriminate the suspect, that evidence is admissible against the suspect
since obtaining biographical information is necessary for the booking process).
122

Id.

123

See U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1113-14 (10th Cir. 2006); Meghan S. Skelton
and James G. Connell, III, The Routine Booking Question Exception To Miranda, 34 U. BALT. L. REV.
55, 60-62 (2004) (explaining a suspect’s admissions made during the routine booking process are
an exception to Miranda warnings because the routine booking process is not an interrogation and
ofﬁcers are not attempting to elicit incriminating information from suspects through the questions
the ofﬁcers ask); James C. Harrington, Civil Rights, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 447, 493 (1995) (stating
the police are allowed to ask suspects routine questions during the booking process without violating
the suspects Fifth Amendment right of self incrimination).
124

See, e.g., Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02.

125

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1114; see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969);
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets-A Constitutional Catch?,
54 DRAKE L. REV. 15, 33-35 (2005) (discussing the rule announced in Davis that unlawful arrests
for the sole purpose of collecting a defendant’s ﬁngerprints makes the ﬁngerprints a fruit of the
unlawful arrest and therefore suppressible); see supra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
126

Olivares-Rangel 458 F.3d at 1115-16.
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did not intend the arrest to procure the evidence.127 Evidence obtained as a result
of exploiting an illegal arrest, warrants suppression if the conduct’s purpose was
investigatory rather than administrative in nature, such as the routine booking
process.128
Therefore, applying the principle of attenuation to Rangel helps explain
the distinction based on the purpose whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied in order to suppress the ﬁngerprints and A-ﬁle.129 Suppressing Rangel’s
ﬁngerprints and A-ﬁle would have a deterrent effect if the government’s purpose
for obtaining Rangel’s ﬁngerprints was to obtain evidence against Rangel since the
agents could foresee that the action of collecting the ﬁngerprints is easily traced
to the unlawful arrest.130 Suppressing the ﬁngerprints in that instance would deter
the government from randomly rounding up suspects, without probable cause,
in order to collect their ﬁngerprints and use them as evidence.131 However, if
the government’s purpose in collecting Rangel’s ﬁngerprints was not to uncover
evidence to use against him, but rather, was for the routine booking process, then
there is no deterrent value in suppressing the evidence since the agents may not

127

Id.

128

Id.; see supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (explaining how attenuation play role
in determining among other things, the foreseeability on the part of the ofﬁcer as to whether the
evidence is related to the unlawful conduct for purposes of deterrence).
129

See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (explaining why attenuation is important
and how to apply it).
130

See generally Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (discussing the importance of
evaluating the government’s purpose of the misconduct that produced the evidence in evaluating
whether the evidence is sufﬁciently attenuated from the unlawful conduct to render it admissible);
U.S. v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding evidence of automobile search
tainted where the purpose of the ofﬁcer’s illegal seizure was designed to uncover evidence). As the
Rangel Court recognized in remanding the case back to the district court, the imperative question in
determining whether Rangel’s ﬁngerprints and A-ﬁle are suppressible turns on the purpose behind
the government’s seizure of the Rangel’s ﬁngerprints. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying
text (explaining how attenuation play role in determining among other things, the foreseeability
on the part of the ofﬁcer as to whether the evidence is related to the unlawful conduct for purposes
of deterrence); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 511
(Thomson/West 2004) (stating when an ofﬁcer can reasonably foresee the challenged evidence as
a product of his illegal conduct then there is a deterrent value and applying the exclusionary rule
makes sense).
131
See generally Sarah Hughes Newman, Proving Probable Cause: Allocating the Burden of Proof
in False Arrest Claims Under § 1983, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 347, 372 (2006) (explaining the exclusionary
rule does not deter police from arresting people without probable cause because the exclusionary
rule only applies to the exclusion of evidence seized; however, the rule does act as a deterrent against
police unlawfully arresting people in order to use evidence subsequently seized against them, since
the rule does apply to evidence); LaFave, Israel & King, supra note 130, at 511 (stating when an
ofﬁcer can reasonably foresee the challenged evidence as a product of his illegal conduct then there
is a deterrent value and applying the exclusionary rule makes sense).
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foresee the evidence as a product of their unlawful arrest.132 Even though the
original arrest may still be unlawful, in this instance, the court should not suppress
the evidence since little, if any, deterrent value exists in suppressing it.133

CONCLUSION
The Rangel court correctly held Rangel’s ﬁngerprints and A-ﬁle are
suppressible, if the district court determines upon remand that the government
obtained the evidence through an investigatory procedure rather than because
of a routine booking process.134 Since Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
the Fourth Amendment prohibits detentions for the sole purpose of collecting a
suspect’s ﬁngerprints.135 Furthermore, courts of varying jurisdictions have dealt
with the admissibility of ﬁngerprints including Lopez-Mendoza.136 Thus, the task
that courts have faced following Davis has been to determine when and how the
exclusionary rule actually applies to evidence of a suspect’s identity.137 Although
some confusion exists among the varying circuit courts as to the applicability of
Lopez-Mendoza, the Rangel court correctly interpreted that opinion, holding that
Lopez-Mendoza applies only to jurisdictional challenges and not to evidentiary

132

See LaFave, Israel & King, supra note 130, at 511 (stating when an ofﬁcer can reasonably
foresee the challenged evidence as a product of his illegal conduct then there is a deterrent value and
applying the exclusionary rule makes sense).
133

See generally Eric Johnson, Causal Relevance in the Law of Search and Seizure, 88 B.U.L. REV.
113, 167 (2008) (stating a court’s focus in determining whether evidence is sufﬁciently causally
related to the government’s unlawful conduct to warrant suppression should focus on ‘“the extent
to which the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule’-the deterrence of police misconduct- will be
advanced by its application in any particular case.” Id. (quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 276 (1968)).
134

U.S. v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116-17 (10th Cir. 2006).

135

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).

136

See, e.g., U.S. v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on Lopez-Mendoza,
holding a defendant’s identity or body is never suppressible even following an unlawful arrest); U.S.
v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding Lopez-Mendoza does not stand for
the broad proposition that a defendant’s identity is never suppressible); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d
1104 (holding Lopez-Mendoza does not stand for the broad proposition that a defendant’s identity
is never suppressible).
137
See, e.g., Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420 (holding that a body or identity is never suppressible
so the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence of a defendant’s identity); Guevara-Martinez,
262 F.3d 751 (holding Lopez-Mendoza does not stand for the broad proposition that a defendant’s
body or identity is never suppressible and therefore there are situations where the exclusionary rule
may act to suppress evidence of a defendant’s ﬁngerprints); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (holding
Lopez-Mendoza does not stand for the broad proposition that a defendant’s body or identity is
never suppressible and therefore there are situations where the exclusionary rule may act to suppress
evidence of a defendant’s ﬁngerprints).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss2/9
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challenges.138 Furthermore, the court correctly characterized the issue regarding
ﬁngerprint admissibility based on the doctrine of attenuation and the purpose for
which the government obtain them.139

138

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112; supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.

139

Supra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
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